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THE HONORABLE JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR. LEGAL
WRITING COMPETITION
WINNING STUDENT COMMENT*

HOW MARYLAND'S SANCTUARY POLICIES ISOLATE
FEDERAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDERMINING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
By: Douglas R. Sahmel

After the September 11, 2001 ("9/11") terrorist attacks, some have
clamored for greater involvement from local police in immigration law
enforcement, largely on the ground that immigration reform is critical
to homeland security. I
A debate has ensued, however, as to whether state and local law
enforcement authorities can, or could be required to, enforce federal
immigration laws? Within this debate, two notable trends are: (1)
efforts by the White House and Congress to expand the role of local
police to voluntarily enforce federal immigration law3; and (2) the
resurgence of state and city "sanctuary" policies opposed to such a
role expansion. 4 Maryland has drawn national media attention with

*

1.

2.

3.
4.

This comment was chosen as the winning entry of The Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.
Legal Writing Competition held by the Maryland Bar Association's Criminal Law
Section in 2006. Publication in The University of Baltimore Law Forum was one of the
distinctions awarded to the winning author. This comment is printed in winning form and
has not been cite-checked for accuracy by staff of The University of Baltimore Law
Forum; thus, no such warranty as to the accuracy of the information is granted by The
University of Baltimore Law Forum.
Lisa M. Seghetti, Stephen R. Viiia, and Karma Ester, Enforcing Immigration Law: The
Role of State and Local Law Enforcement, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE I (Oct.
13, 2005) (Order Code RL32270); Michael M. Hethmon, In The Aftermath Of
September II: Defending Civil Liberties In The Nation's Capital: The Treatment Of
Immigrants: THE CHIMERA AND THE COP: LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83 (2004).
SEGHETTI, supra, note I, at 4.
Michael 1. Wishnie, 22nd Annual Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Terrorism and the
Constitution: Civil Liberties in a New America: State and Local Police Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004).
SEGHETTI, supra, note I, "Summary", and at 22-23.
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such policies in effect in the cities of Baltimore, Takoma Park, and
Greenbelt, and in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties. s
Congress squarely took aim at sanctuary policies in two federal
statutes well before 9111-in 1996-but some localities nationwide
continue to ignore these laws. 6 Several bills pending in the 109th
Congress would in part undermine these non-cooperation policies and
clarify that they are violative of federal law. 7 In Maryland, the
General Assembly last session saw heated battles over immigration8which is increasingly becoming an election issue-and could see more
of the same in 2006. Indeed, the results of the coming immigration
debate on Capitol Hill and in Annapolis could have profound
implications for Maryland's criminal justice system.
This essay will argue that Maryland's sanctuary ordinances violate
both federal law and the U.S. Constitution, while undermining our
criminal justice system. Part I identifies the problem; Part II discusses
the need for change; Part III discusses alternatives for addressing the
problem; and Part IV advocates one or more proposals.
I.

THE PROBLEM: SANCTUARY LAWS' DEFIANCE OF
FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CREATES A
LEGAL FOG THAT UNDERMINES OUR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND SECURITY

A.

Background: The 1996 Laws and Maryland's Contrary Sanctuary
Ordinances

Section 642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (lIRIRA) of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1373(a)) provides that,
"[nJotwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization

5.

6.
7.

8.

See Alex Meneses Mivashita, Maryland Communities Protest Patriot Act, Fox News,
Oct. 13, 2003, http;llwww.foxnews.comlstory/0.2933.99927.00.html(last visited Jan.
27,2006).
SEGHEITI, supra note I, at note 76.
Andorra Bruno, Ruth Ellen Wasem, Alison Siskin, and Bias Nufiez-Neto, Michael John
Garcia, Stephen R. Vifia, and Karma Ester, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the
I09th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 5 (Oct. 17, 2005) (Order Code
RL33125).
See David Abrams, Security and Hospitality Fuel Immigration Debate, THE CAPITAL
(Annapolis, MD), March 18,2005.
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Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.,,9
Using nearly identical language, Section 434 of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
of 1996 states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be
prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United
States."IO
In sharp contrast to this language, however, Maryland's local
sanctuary laws expressly impede government employees from
cooperating and communicating with federal immigration authorities.
For instance, a 2003 Baltimore City Council resolution--entitled the
'Preservation of Civil Liberties Resolution - USA Patriot Act'directs the Baltimore City Police Department to "[r]efrain from
enforcing immigration matters, which are entirely the responsibility of
the Department of Homeland Security." II A Prince George's County
Council resolution directs "the Chief of Police and each member of the
Prince George's County Police Department" to "[r]efrain from
enforcing immigration matters that are the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security.,,12 Resolutions passed by the
Takoma Park City Council, the Greenbelt City Council, and the
Montgomery County Council contain analogous language.13
Proponents of sanctuary laws generally assert that the local
authority for enacting these directives is grounded in the states' Tenth
Amendment sovereignty right, and on the view that the "[p]ower to
9. 8 U.S.C.S. § l373(a) (2005).
10. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1644 (2005).
11. Baltimore City Council Resolution 03-1046(1 )(a), American Civil Liberties Union,
Baltimore,
MD
City
Council
Resolution,
http://www.aciu.orglsafefree/
resources/l 7260res20030519 .html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
12. Prince George's County Council Resolution No. CR-78-2003, American Civil Liberties
Union,
Prince
George's
County,
MD,
http://www.aciu.orglsafefree/
resources/l 6982res2003 1215 .html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
13. See American Civil Liberties Union, Takoma Park City Council Resolution on Protecting
Civil Liberties, http://www.aciu.org/safefree/resources/17656res2002l029.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006); Maryland Latino Coalition for Justice, Resolution to Protect Civil
Liberties in Greenbelt --- presented by Greenbelt Bill of Rights Defense Coalition,
http://www.latinosinmaryland.org/tool_kitresolutiongreen.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2006); American Civil Liberties Union, Montgomery County, MD Resolution,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/177ll res2003l 00 l.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2006).
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regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.,,14
Sanctuary policy critics, however, maintain that local non-cooperation
ordinances violate federal law and the Constitution as they are
preempted by the 1996 statutes under the Supremacy Clause. IS

B.

Non-Cooperation Laws Create A Legal Fog That Undermines
Criminal Justice And Our Security

A major problem posed by sanctuary laws' defiance of federal law
is that they create a legal fog that undermines our criminal justice
system and security. As a police officer from sanctuary city Houston,
Texas, told the House Judiciary Committee in 2003:
When local agencies around the country enact a
"sanctuary law" type of policy, society at large is
placed at risk. Sanctuary laws undermine the authority
and effectiveness of street level officers and completely
render them ineffective to prevent potential further
criminal activity. With this type of policy, authorities
may never know if an individual is in the United States
illegally and if they could have been removed before
they had the opportunity to commit a criminal act. 16
The legal fog and hamstringing of law enforcement that sanctuary
laws engender present real dangers to not only Marylanders, but to all
Americans.
C. Sanctuary Laws' Invalidity

Sanctuary laws are invalid for three reasons: first, sanctuary
supporters' Tenth Amendment claim turns federalism on its head
while violating federal and Constitutional law. Second, the IIRIRA
and PRWORA provisions are legitimate federal enactments that
preempt contrary local law under the Supremacy Clause. Third, by
brazenly violating statutory and Constitutional law and defying
Congress's will, sanctuary policies are incongruous with both our

14. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 u.s. 351, 354 (1976).
15. SEGHElTl, supra note I, at 23.
16. New York City's 'Sanctuary' Policy and the Effect of Such Policies on Public Safety, Law
Enforcement, and Immigration, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85-287 PDF, I08th Congo 19
(Feb. 27, 2003) (prepared Statement of John Nickell).
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general governmental framework, and with the deference traditionally
given to the federal immigration power.
(1) Sanctuary Supporters' Tenth Amendment Claim Turns Federalism
On Its Head To Violate Federal And Constitutional Law

In order to evade rightful federal preemption, sanctuary supporters
argue that states and localities have a sovereignty right under the
Tenth Amendment to not participate in the federal enforcement of
immigration law. This claim fails because it is inconsistent with basic
federalism principles and is inapposite where the federal government
merely invites, rather than requires, local involvement.
Interestingly, this very issue was litigated before the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in City of New York v. United States. I 7 There,
a unanimous court struck down New York City's controversial
sanctuary law and roundly rejected the city's Tenth Amendment
challenge of federal preemption. The court wrote that this claim "asks
us to turn the Tenth Amendment's shield against the federal
government's using state and local governments to enact and
administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and localities
to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs.,d8
Moreover, the Second Circuit explained that states "do not retain
under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all
voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal
programs.,tl9 The City of New York rightly asserted that under Printz
v. United States,20 the Tenth Amendment is a bar to federal
commandeering of state resources to enforce immigration law. 21
However, as the Second Circuit noted, the Tenth Amendment offers
no protection when, as here, the federal government invites states to
enforce federal law. 22
Sanctuary supporters, then, tum federalism on its head in claiming
the authority to violate federal law and the Supremacy Clause through
naked legislative overreach. This power grab reflects a contempt for
federal authority and Congress's will, as well as an erroneous view of
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

179 F.3d 29 (1999).
/d. at 35.
ld. at 36.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws In The Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement Of Immigration Laws Violates The Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 965, 975 (2004).
22. City of New York, supra note 17, at 36; Pham, supra note 21, at 975.
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Tenth Amendment sovereignty. However noble its motives or
convincing the guise of 'federalism,' a local government unmoored
from superseding law and its constitutional responsibilities could
cause much chaos, conflict, and confusion indeed.
(2) Maryland's Sanctuary Laws Are Preempted By Sections 642
and 434 Under the Supremacy Clause

IIRIRA § 642(a) and PRWORA § 434 trump contrary local laws
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 23 Under the
Supremacy Clause, "[w]henever the constitutional powers of the
federal government and those of the state come into conflict, the latter
must yield.,,24 The resultant and overriding "Law of the Land,,25 is "as
much a part of the law of each State, and as binding upon its
authorities and people, as its own local constitution and laws. ,,26
Further, under Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland
Constitution,
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws
made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof,
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, are, and shall be the
Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of this State,
and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound
thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this
State to the contrary notwithstanding. 27
The determinative question in this Supremacy Clause analysis is
whether the application of the local law under review "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. ,,28 Here, Sections 642 and 434 state that
localities "may not prohibit, or in any way restrict" employees from
sharing immigration information with federal authorities. In 1996,
Congress intended to undermine sanctuary ordinances, facilitate local
government employees III voluntarily providing immigration
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

u.s. Const. art. VI, c!. 2.
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927).
U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
Fanners' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35 (1875).
Md. Canst., Dec!. of Rights art. 2.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941); See Seth P. Waxman and Trevor W.
Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the
Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2215 (2003); See also, Bradford R. Clark, The
Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 91, 93
(2003).
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infonnation to federal authorities and, more broadly, foster local
enforcement of immigration law. 29 Legislative history confinns that
these were Congress's objectives in passing the 1996 provisions. The
Conference Report to PRWORA states that:
The conferees intend to give State and local officials
the authority to communicate with the INS regarding
the presence, whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens.
This provision is designed to prevent any State or local
law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional
provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that
prohibits or in any way restricts any communication
between State and local officials and the INS. The
conferees believe that immigration law enforcement is
as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the
right to remain in the United States undetected and
unapprehended. 30
Support for these Congressional purposes is also found in the fact
that sanctuary laws have long been a Congressional targee 1 and, as
some legislation now pending in Congress expressly states, that local
non-cooperation laws violate Sections 642 and 434. For example,
Section 4(a) of S. 1362, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of
2005, provides that:
A statute, policy, or practice that prohibits a law
enforcement officer of a State, or of a political
subdivision of a State, from enforcing Federal
immigration laws or from assisting or cooperating with
Federal immigration law enforcement in the course of
carrying out the law enforcement duties of the officer
or from providing infonnation to an official of the
United States Government regarding the immigration
status of an individual who is believed to be illegally
present in the United States is in violation of section
29. Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View From The Prairie: Harold Washington And The People
Of Illinois Respond To Federal Encroachment Of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L. J. 285,
304-305 (Winter, 2005) (explaining that "Congress sought to counter. .. local [noncooperation] responses").
30. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649,
2771.
31. David Firestone, Giuliani to Sue Over Provision on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,1996,
Section B, Page I, Column 5.
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642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.c.
1373(a)) and section 434 of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Op~ortunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8
U.S.C. 1644).3
(a) Maryland's sanctuary laws directly conflict with the 1996
provisions and are therefore preempted by those federal statutes
Maryland's sanctuary laws are in direct conflict with Sections 642
and 434 by requiring local police to "refrain" from the very conductthe sharing of immigration information with federal authorities-that
Congress says localities "may not prohibit, or in any way restrict"
under Sections 642 and 434. Both the federal and local laws target
local authorities, but federal law promotes precisely what the local law
inhibits. In so doing, non-cooperation laws constitute a 'restriction' or
'prohibition' within the plain meaning of the federal statutory
prohibitions, and present a blatant 'obstacle' to the goals of the 1996
laws. Toward this end, some sanctuary ordinances even brashly state
their disapproval of Congress' goal of local immigration enforcement,
thus laying bare the fact that they directly oppose the federal
objectives at issue here.
The Montgomery County Council
Resolution, for instance, opines that:
[I]n addition to the passage of the Patriot Act, the
federal government has taken a number of other steps
in the aftermath of September 11 that threaten to
undermine the fundamental rights and liberties
guaranteed by the Constitutions of the State of
Maryland and the United States, as well as Community
Policing and other law enforcement strategies designed
to build trust between the police and communities, such
as encouraging local law enforcement to enforce
provisions of federal immigration law that historically
have been an exclusive province of the federal
government. ... 33
This issue, then, is not a case of a federal statute being silent or
ambiguous, but merely disagreeable to certain local authorities' policy
and political preferences. States are bound under the Supremacy
Clause by the entire law of the land, not just to those laws in line with
32. S. 1362, I09th Congo (2005) (Emphasis added).
33. Montgomery County Resolution No. 107-56 (2003) (Emphasis added).
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the policy or political preferences of the local governing majority.
Local disapproval of certain federal laws, moreover, does not justify
manifesting that dislike through uncooperative local legislation.
Further, with respect to sanctuary laws' hindrance of the "full
purposes and objectives of Congress," some observers argue that noncooperation ordinances interfere with the Constitutional objectives of
the federal government. Under this view, non-cooperation policies
impede the United States' Constitutionally-conferred "guarantee" to
protect the states from both "invasion" and "domestic violence" under
Article IV, § IV?4 When the local police who interact most closely
with the illegal alien population do not assist the more-removed
federal authorities, the federal government's ability to protect the
states is significantly diminished than had that cooperation occurred.
This sort of impediment, one could argue, is a particularly flagrant
"obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. ,,35
Therefore, as Maryland's sanctuary laws frustrate both the
Congressional and Constitutional objectives of the federal
government, they are preempted by the 1996 statutes under the
Supremacy Clause.
(3) Sanctuary Laws are Inconsistent with Both Supreme Court
Precedent and the General Deference Given to the Federal
Government in Immigration Matters
(a) Sections 642 and 434 are valid Congressional enactments
pursuant to the long-recognized federal immigration power

IIRIRA § 642(a) and PRWORA § 434 are plainly valid enactments
by Congress pursuant to its long-recognized 'plenary' power over
immigration matters. 36 The Supreme Court "without exception has
sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.,,,37 Notably, the Court in the 19th century
34. Bill O'Reilly, Politicians Failing To Protect and Serve, The Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 11,2003,
at 19A.
35. HINES, supra note 28, at 67.
36. See Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative
Deportation Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1851 (1998) (explaining Congress's
"plenary power in the [immigration] field").
37. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 386 U.S.
118, 123 (1967)).
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struck down various state efforts to regulate immigration-and
affirmed Congressional authority to do so--in seminal decisions such
as The Passenger Cases (1849),38 the Head Money Cases (1884),39
and The Chinese Exclusion Case (1889)40. This precedent helped
establish Congress's well-settled authority over immigration matters. 41
(b) Sanctuary laws are inconsistent with deference given to the federal
immigration power.
Finally, sanctuary laws are inconsistent with the deference
generally given to the federal government in immigration matters. As
the Supreme Court explained in Mathews v. Diaz, "[f]or reasons long
recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship
between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to
the political branches of the Federal Government. ,,42 When states and
localities enact their own immigration policies, it contradicts this
fundamental principle and harkens back to the immigration policies of
the early American states, which Congress eventually harmonized by
asserting its national power over immigration. 43
In sum, sanctuary policies violate federal laws, the Constitution,
and are inconsistent with both our general federal framework and with
the deference traditionally given to the federal government in
immigration matters. They find no support in the Constitution,
statutory law, or Supreme Court precedent, and are antithetical to our
federalist system.
II. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
There is an urgent need to eliminate Maryland's sanctuary laws and
ensure the uniform enforcement of immigration law in the State. Noncooperation policies are unlawful and unconstitutional, undermine law
enforcement and criminal justice, and imperil our domestic and

38.
39.
40.
41.

48 U.S. 283 (1849).
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
Stephen L. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy (4th ed. 2005), at 1045, 108.
42. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
43. LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 14-15; See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); see also
Developments in the Law -- Jobs and Borders, v. The Constitutionality of Immigration
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247,2268 (2005).
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national security. Moreover, the dangers of these illegitimate policies
are significantly heightened in the post-9fll era.
Sanctuary laws hinder the administration of criminal justice by,
among other things, sowing confusion-and perhaps conflict-among
local law enforcement, citizens, and noncitizens. Today, immigration
law in Maryland is enforced differently across various cities and
counties. This is inconsistent with our fundamental notions of a
national immigration system and ofa "supreme Law of the Land.,,44
For example, a Prince George's County police officer, under that
jurisdiction's sanctuary policy, is barred from sharing immigration
information with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; his
counterpart across the county line in Anne Arundel County, however,
is free to do so. Should that Prince George's County officer wish to
enforce immigration law in accordance with the 1996 laws, is he
bound by the local Resolution? Should this officer be punished for
violating one law, though he followed another? Further, how would a
highly mobile illegal criminal alien fare in the state's differing
jurisdictions if, say, local and municipal law enforcement were
collaborating to apprehend him?
These and other problems create significant uncertainty for all
involved, and could conceivably spark conflicts between the State's
counties and cities. The local governments who brazenly enacted
sanctuary laws would do well to recall James Madison's Federalist
No. 10, where he observed: "The instability, injustice, and confusion
introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished. ,,45
Non-cooperation policies primarily endanger our national security
by, as the name suggests, requiring that local police refuse to
cooperate in immigration law enforcement. This audacious flouting of
federal law-that was passed by elected representatives to promote
public safety and the general welfare, among other things-is
particularly troubling in a post-9/11 world.
Sanctuary laws seem especially hazardous in light of the broad
trends-namely terrorism, crime, and illegal immigrationsignificantly impacting today's society.
First, with respect to
terrorism, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
44. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cI. 2.
45. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), http://thomas.loc.govlhomelhistdoxlfed_lO.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
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United States ("Commission"), in chilling detail, uncovered the many
security-related failures of our immigration system before 9/11; the
Commission consequently made immigration reform a dominant
theme in its recommendations. 46 Also, as journalist and author
Michelle Malkin noted in her 2004 testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee:
More than half of the 48 Islamic radicals convicted
or tied to recent terrorist plots in the United States over
the past decade either were themselves illegal aliens or
relied on illegals to get fake IDs. Immigration violators
participated in the first attack on the World Trade
Center, the Los Angeles Millenium bombing plot, and
the New York subway bombing conspiracy. Three of
the 9/11 hijackers were here illegally; two had previous
immigration violations . . . Three 9/11 hijackersMohammed Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrahcame into contact with state and local police before the
attacks for speeding. Atta and Hanjour were visa
violators. 47
In fact on September 9, 2001, a Maryland state trooper stopped
9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah in rural Cecil County; the speeding ticket
was later found in his rental car's glove compartment at Newark
Airport. 48
Second, and beyond the terrorism context, sanctuary laws endanger
Marylanders' domestic security by ignoring ever-rising immigration
levels and crime, as well as their occasional intersection. Regarding
immigration, the number of illegal aliens in Maryland doubled to
250,000 between 2000 and 2004, according to the Pew Hispanic
Center. 49 The explosion of legal and illegal immigration in the state is
46. Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, 9/11 Commission: Current Legislative
Proposals for U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, Congressional Research Service, I (Oct.
18,2004) (Order Code RL32616).
47. State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a United Approach
for Stopping Terrorists, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security,
and Citizenship of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 108th Congo (April 22, 2004)
(statement of Michelle Malkin).
48. Sheila MacVicar and Caroline Faraj, September II Hijacker Questioned In January 2001,
CNN, Aug. I, 2002, http://archives.cnn.comJ2002/US/08/01/cia.hijacker/index.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
49. Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented
Population, Pew Hispanic Center, March 21, 2005, at 7; S.A. Miller, Ehrlich says
Duncan wrong on illegal aliens; Calls rival's accepting attitude 'divergent', THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 19,2005, at AO!.
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creating a major political issue in the run-up to the 2006 gubernatorial
election. As CNN commentator Lou Dobbs observed, "the numbers
have grown so fast [in Maryland], it's now shaping into a campaign
theme.,,5o
With respect to immigration and crime, illegal immigration has
become the number one federal crime in the United States, with onethird of federal prosecutions in Fiscal Year 2004 relating to
immigration-the largest share of all such prosecutions. 51 The United
States is also home to more than "400,000 alien absconders and more
than 85,000 criminal illegal aliens," as Congressman Charles F. Bass
noted on the House Floor last year. 52
In sum, sanctuary ordinances, in addition to lacking valid legal
justification, impede criminal justice and endanger Marylanders in a
variety of ways. Given the interplay between terrorism, crime, and
soaring immigration levels, an approach that brazenly ignores federal
law and Congressional intent should not be tolerated, particularly with
respect to security matters. Sanctuary laws should no longer be seen
as the harmless political protest of a few "progressive" councils
(Montgomery and Prince George's Counties together have 1.7 million
people, while Baltimore City has 630,000),53 and it is imperative that
these policies be abolished.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
Various alternatives have been put forth, many in legislation
introduced in Congress, for remedying the problem of sanctuary
policies. Among these numerous suggestions are:

50. Lou Dobbs, Lou Dobbs Tonight: Official English?; Terrorists Target Navy Ships; lllegal
Aliens in Maryland; Merck Loses Vioxx Case; Secretary Rice Changes China Rhetoric;
Safety vs. Privacy in Airports (Television Broadcast, Aug. 19, 2005),
http://transcripts.cnn.comlTRANSCRIPTS/050SI19/ldt.01.html(last visited Jan. 28,
2006).
51. Le Templar, 1llegal Entry Tops Crime List, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2005,
http://www.eastvaUeytribune.comlindex.php?sty=4671O (last visited Jan. 27, 2006);
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Prosecution Of Immigration Cases Surge
In U.S.; Sentences Slump; Massive Jump Found In One Judicial District (2005), at
http://trac.syr.edultracins/latest/current/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
52. lSI Congo Rec. H 11956 (Dec. 16,2005) (statement of Rep. Bass).
53. U.S.
Bureau
of
the
Census,
State
&
County
Quickfacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/24031.html(Montgomery
County);
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/24033.html(Prince
George's
County);
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/2404000.html(Baltimore City) (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006).
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First, Congress could withhold federal funds
governments that refuse to enforce immigration law. 54
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Second, the federal government, groups, or individuals could
mount legal challenges in sanctuary cities, counties, or states. Fox
News commentator Bill O'Reilly has suggested that "embarrassing
lawsuits" against a locality and its officials might be effective as
"[p ]olitical pressure does not seem to be working. ,,55 Interest groups
such as the Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement (FILE) have
been suing sanctuary localities for years. 56
Third, Congress could pass legislation-such as S.1438, the
Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005clarifying that states possess 'inherent' authority to enforce federal
immigration law; in such a measure, Congress could expressly declare
that these sanctuary laws violate federallaw. 57
Fourth, Congress more generally could enact legislation-such as
H.R. 3137, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
(CLEAR) Act of 2005-to broaden the local role in immigration law
enforcement in various ways. 58
Also, Congress could pass legislation providing various kinds of
immunities and reimbursement to localities assisting in enforcing
federal immigration law. 59
IV. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES
Regarding these various proposals, enacting federal legislation that
would withhold funds from sanctuary cities and counties has the
advantage of being a quick way to punish and deter defiant localities.
Its disadvantages, however, are that it somewhat circumvents the fact
that sanctuary policies are illegal, and it does not guarantee
compliance. A worst-case scenario, moreover, is that such a policy
54. BRUNO, supra note 7, at 5; See PHAM, supra note 21, at note 56 (observing that the
CLEAR Act "requires states who receive federal reimbursement under section 24I(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ... or who want to receive additional federal funds
available under the CLEAR Act to pass laws pennitting local enforcement of
immigration laws").
55. Bill O'Reilly, The O'Reilly Factor: Talking Points Memo and Top Story (Television
Broadcast, Jan. 3, 2003).
56. Jerry Seper, Illegal Criminal Aliens Abound in U.S., THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 26,
2004, at AO 1.
57. SEGHETTI, supra note 1, at 19.
58. !d.
59. BRUNO, supra note 7, at 5.
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might endanger citizens by depriving a locality of needed homeland
security funding that later experienced a terrorist attack.
With respect to the notion of challenging sanctuary policies in
court, this approach could provide a strong incentive for local officials
to rethink and perhaps abolish their sanctuary policies, as some
observers have noted. Such litigation would also enjoy extensive
media coverage that could raise public awareness of the issue. Some
disadvantages of this approach, however, are that it might be difficult
to find plaintiffs with standing, and the possibility of a legal setback
looms.
As to the idea of federal legislation clarifying that states possess
inherent authority to enforce immigration law, this approach would
help clear up the significant confusion and onfc0ing academic debate
as to whether states do possess this authority. 0 Mere statements on
inherent authority and sanctuary laws' illegality, however, would be
unlikely to prompt localities to abolish their sanctuary policies; such a
statement would be more effective as part of a broader package.
The various proposals to broaden local involvement in immigration
matters could play a significant role in spurring localities to
voluntarily enforce immigration law in concert with federal
authorities.
(These proposals, and their ramifications and
justifications, are well beyond the scope of this paper.) As with
declarations about states' inherent authority, however, they alone
would probably not provide enough of a 'stick' to prompt localities to
rethink or abolish their sanctuary laws.
Finally, with regard to legislation providing various kinds of
immunities and reimbursements to cooperative localities, such
legislation would be helpful but should similarly be part of a broader
package of reforms. One disadvantage is that these benefits to
localities would still not get at the problem of existing sanctuary laws.
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of these various proposals,
the best approach would likely be to employ a patchwork of these
suggestions:
First, Congressional withholding of funds to sanctuary cities and
counties could provide the strongest 'stick' to modify these localities'
conduct. By depriving these cities of money, a local government's
shrinking coffers might cause officials to rethink what is primarily
political opposition to enforcing immigration law.
60. See HETHMON, supra note 1, at 89-92.
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Second, initiating litigation challenging a sanctuary policy is also
advisable, particularly because the federal government would likely
prevail on the merits in the vast majority of courts. These legal
challenges could conceivably be brought by the federal governmentsuch as the Homeland Security Secretary or by the Attorney Generalby groups, or by a private citizen with standing. 61 As to Maryland's
sanctuary policies specifically, one could imagine that should such
litigation reach the generally conservative Fourth Circuit, that court
would reach a conclusion similar to that reached in City of New York.
Further, should the issue of Maryland police enforcing federal
immigration law arise in litigation, plaintiffs could rely on Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Berg,62 where the Court
of Appeals expressly held that "state and local law enforcement
officials may appropriately enforce federallaw.,,63
Third, Congress should pass a comprehensive package that:
declares states' inherent authority and the illegality of sanctuary
policies; provides various 'carrots' to reward cooperative local
governments; and expands and encourages local immigration law
enforcement. Increasing local involvement might help change the
current, muddled paradigm in immigration law enforcement such that
sanctuary cities would be viewed as tremendously unhelpful in the
homeland security effort. Several bills currently pending in the I09 th
Congress would do many of these exact things. 64 Legislative efforts in
the Maryland General Assembly could complement Congress'
objectives in this area as well.
Finally, these efforts should be complemented by a well-organized
lobbying effort, at both the so-called 'grassroots' and 'grasstops'
levels, to influence the Maryland governments with sanctuary laws to
repeal them. At the 'grassroots', this effort could involve, among
other things, public opinion polling and airing local advertisements
and editorials to gin up public support for eliminating sanctuary
policies. At the 'grasstops', various organizations such as the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and the
National Governors' Association-along with state- and national-level
criminal justice organizations such as the National Sheriffs'
Association-should be enlisted in this effort, which should be
coupled with pressure from state public officials.
61. HETHMON, supra note 1 at 95-96.
62. 342 Md. 126 (1996).
63. Id. at 139.
64. SEGHEITI, supra note 1, at 1.

